Financiamento privado do agronegócio: contratos de concessão de crédito privado e o comportamento oportunista

Abstract

The Brazilian agribusiness is one of the country’s economy main motors. Its development since the 1980’s, with new technologies and new business management techniques being introduced, have been rapidly raising the productivity. Its conformation approaching modern management techniques starts to be seen systematically and named as Agribusiness Systems. Its analysis on a systemic pattern is based on two elements: first, the agriculture starts to be seen as an independent and specialized field, whose agents act in a chain of industries; secondly, the value-added in farms is diluted through the productive chain as a part of the production total value. Theses system have a particular governmental structure, mainly hybrid, in which eventually requested contracts contain the specificities and the uncertainties regarding the agribusiness and specially the frequency of transactions involved. Part of such scenery are credit granting contracts, especially those between rural producers and agents that do not perform in the traditional financial system. For the case presented in this dissertation, for methodological purposes, it is specially based on soya complex, for which financers are tradings, industries, input distributors etc. The credit granting contracts for private funding are victims, just as any other contract, of opportunists’ behaviors that currently are related to exposing the contractors to the price risk. The commodities market volatility is always present and situations in which there are great prize hikes or abrupt declines enhance such behaviors mentioned, which could be avoided by resorting on solutions already existing in the stock markets.