Risco operacional, crédito e crescimento econômico

Abstract

Amid the discussions about the new standardized approach (SMA) for capital requirements of operational risk and the possible extinction of the internal models (AMA), this study analyzes the effects of information asymmetry (a strong characteristic of operational risk) in the interactions between the regulator and the bank regarding the adoption of internal models in the current format. For this, we used the model from ELIZALDE and REPULLO (2007) adapted to operational risk in order to study the behavior of the shareholders of the banks in an internal model and the theory of sequential games of asymmetric information to evaluate the interaction between the regulator and the banks. The results indicate that adhesion to the AMA is not a Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium and that the return to a standardized model, either by the SMA or the current models, forms the only Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium strategy, which explains the low adhesion to the AMA even more than one decade after the proposition of this model and suggests the need to create mechanisms to reduce this asymmetry. As the inadequate capital requirement interferes in financial intermediation, this paper also analyzes a relationship between a credit grant and economic growth, making use of finance growth nexus theory and an empirical model applied to Brazilian municipalities. The results indicate that credit grant reduces economic growth volatility and, specifically in Sudeste and Nordeste regions, there was a strong evidence that credit stimulates economic growth of municipalities.